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The Effects of Presumptive Methods of Taxation on Revenue Mobilization in the Value 
Added Tax1 
Gohar S. Sedrakyan 




Recent economic studies of presumptive taxation in the ECA region suggest negative effects of 
these tax modes on tax revenues mobilization. This study uses a three-stage methodology to 
estimate the effect of presumptive taxation on revenue mobilization for the VAT. First, we 
develop a new approach to estimate the true VAT potential tax base in an economy that includes 
presumptive taxation. Next, the paper assesses potential tax collections reflecting true taxable 
capacity and a tax effort index, suggesting the presence of inefficiencies in the tax system and 
sizable tax avoidance. Second, we use regression analysis to test for the scale of impact of 
presumptive taxation on VAT collections. Third, we use vector autoregression analysis (VAR) to 
analyze the bidirectional effect of VAT actual and potential collection and presumptive taxation 
modes in short and long-term perspective. For contrasting the variance of impact of presumptive 
taxation on VAT mobilization we use two different presumptive tax modes, simplified tax and 
presumptive payments, with different tax structures. We use data for Armenia for the numerical 
application of the analysis. Our findings reveal that, indeed, Armenia’s simplified tax has a 
significant distorting and diminishing effect on VAT collections. Meanwhile, presumptive 
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1 The author is indebted to Andrew Feltenstein and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez for many helpful suggestions 
and comments.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The focus of this paper is to study the effect of presumptive taxation mechanisms on tax 
revenues collection, when governments attempt to promote small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) or to tax those industries, where the general application of the regular tax base 
calculation is inefficient2.  Other times, in fact, governments may implement presumptive 
taxation mechanisms seeking to increase tax revenue inflows.  
This study is conducted using data from Armenia covering the period from 1997 to 2015, 
employing a three-stage methodology to analyze the impact on revenue mobilization of 
presumptive taxes that include presumptive payments and simplified tax modes.   
The choice of Armenia as a case study for deriving empirical results is straightforward.  
This country has a comparatively simple fiscal system associated with all three tax modes.  The 
discussion on the main differences among the general tax mode and two other presumptive 
methods is presented in Appendix 1. As it described, from the tax accounting standpoint VAT 
plays the most essential role in each of the three tax modes and it ensures the largest stream of 
government revenues (Tables 1 and 2). Thus, the ratio of collected VAT-to GDP is in the range 
of 4.64 − 9.12 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡. The revenues from presumptive taxes are quite insignificant and the 
ratio for combined presumptive taxes-to-GDP is in the range of 0.3 − 0.99 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 (Table 3). 
Both presumptive taxes also have lower effective tax rates, and are simpler to comply with 
internal tax accounting and tax filing to authorities.  
The methodology of the study estimates the “true” tax base associated with potential 
VAT revenue collections. To reveal the potential negative effect of presumptive taxes on VAT 
revenues, we proceed with two different econometric tools. We use Ordinary Least Square 
                                                          
2 The general development of economic thought addressing presumptive taxation is discussed in the Literature 
Review section. Appendix 1 provides details on two specific presumptive taxation modes used in this study.    
(OLS) to analyze the effect of ratios of collected VAT, simplified tax and presumptive payments 
on VAT taxable capacity (TC) and a tax effort index (TEI). Further, the vector autoregression 
function (VAR) is applied to all five indicators of actual and potential tax collection performance 
in VAT and presumptive taxes in order to reveal additional information on short and long-term 
bidirectional causalities associated with these indicators.     
The study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it offers a new methodology 
for the potential VAT calculation or estimation of the true VAT capacity. Second, it estimates 
whether tax simplification policies in Armenia (and potentially in other countries) support higher 
tax revenue collections or actually result in lower revenues. In fact, the study finds that 
presumptive taxes can have an adverse effect on actual and potential VAT collections. Third, we 
nevertheless find that presumptive payments applied to the enterprises, where the tax base 
calculation is based on the business specific indicators, can have a positive effect on tax 
revenues. On the other hand, the simplified tax, which has a similar tax base to the VAT but it 
actually works as a business turnover for the reported period, has a very significant distorting 
effect and can become a tool for tax avoidance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers the literature review. 
Section 3 estimates the “true” tax base associated with potential VAT revenue collection and 
applies it to assess the “true” taxable capacity and tax effort index in VAT.  Section 4 introduces 
two multiple regressions using the Ordinary Least Square to test a hypothesis whether 
presumptive taxes have a significant effect on VAT collection, using the newly assessed VAT 
taxable capacity and tax effort index as dependent variables. Section 5 applies vector 
autoregression (VAR) tools to analyze the interactions of all five actual and potential tax 
collection measurements in short and long-term perspectives. Section 6 concludes the study.     
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many past studies have addressed issues affecting effective tax mobilization. More recent 
reports suggest that it would be hard to secure sustainable economic growth in a country, where 
the tax-to-GDP ratio is below 15 percent. As some of the challenges in developing countries the 
economists cite the structure of economy, which creates additional difficulties for effective tax 
collection, limited capacity of the tax administration, data scarcity or poor quality of data and 
political set up being less amenable to rational tax policies than in advanced countries. In 
economies, where public feels recognized and their interests being properly represented, 
taxpayers are willing to contribute more in form of taxes, than in the societies, where people feel 
neglected and underrepresented, farther causing tax avoidance. Also the environment of 
competition and budgetary constraints, where firms cannot manipulate production expenditures, 
drives them into underground operations in response to tax increases leading to serious 
macroeconomic disruptions in the form of reduced tax base and lower tax revenues (Tanzi and 
Zee, 2000; Dabla-Norris and Feltenstein, 2005; Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2014; 
World Bank, 2015).  
The studies addressing countries of ECA region identify some of the issues of tax 
mobilization associated with the counter effect of presumptive taxes. Thus, in Georgia, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic the lower tax rates and simplified reporting of simplified tax 
applied to SMEs, instead of stimulating these businesses to grow larger and bringing them to the 
formal sector of general taxation, in long-term cause these companies to use techniques such as 
bribery, business subdivision, etc. to reduce turnover and continue being taxed as SMEs. In 
Armenia a study reveals large discrepancies in levied tax burden for the firms operating in the 
general tax mode and presumptive taxes. The discrepancy in tax burden combined with the 
simpler tax accounting and tax filing routines in both presumptive taxes could incentivize tax 
avoidance (Sedrakyan, 2007; World Bank, 2011).  
Thuronyi (1996) discusses the main situations when presumptive techniques of tax 
administration could be useful and he addresses six general conditions. Some of those conditions 
are as follows: simplification of compliance burden for taxpayers with low turnover; provision of 
objective indicators for tax assessment, where presumptive methods may lead to a more realistic 
distribution of the tax burden; rebuttable presumption to encourage taxpayers to maintain proper 
accounting; minimum taxes to stimulate higher revenue inflow, etc. This paper addresses the 
effect of the first two stipulations of presumptive techniques: the simplification of compliance 
burden and the provision of more realistic tax assessment indicators3.   
Economic literature addressing the importance of more thorough assessment of the 
principals and mechanisms of presumptive taxation summarizes that although this tax 
mechanisms had been widely used by industrial and developing countries for tax administration 
purposes; however, the public finance literature failed to provide comprehensive studies of the 
specifics for effective design and implementation of presumptive mechanisms. While earlier 
studies of presumptive taxation viewed it as an alternative/companion mechanism to income tax, 
more recent papers on presumptive taxation view it in a broader spectrum, which can be an 
alternative to both income tax and VAT, especially while considering tax systems in ECA 
region. Additionally, the public economists note the scarcity of the research on the use of 
presumptive taxation modes and control of consequent corruption (Casanegra de Jantscher and 
Tanzi (1987); Faulk, Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace (2006); Engelschalk and Loeprick, 2015). 
                                                          
3 The Government of Armenia denotes simplified tax as the tax associated with the simplification of compliance 
burden and presumptive payments as the tax associated with the utilization of business specific indicators. The paper 
follows the same notation.   
In the public economics literature some of the most common studied determinants for 
effective tax system are tax effort index and taxable capacity. In general, the higher actual tax 
mobilization corresponds with a higher volume of estimated tax effort, which also shows that a 
particular country better utilizes the fiscal and tax administration mechanisms in a given 
economy. In the literature the terms tax effort and tax effort index are used interchangeably. The 
more common approach is to use tax effort in reference to the actual tax-to GDP ratio, taxable 
capacity as the predicted tax-to-GDP ratio and tax effort index as ratio of tax effort to taxable 
capacity (Bahl, 1971; Piancastelli, 2001; Le, et al. 2012; Feltenstein et al., 2017).     
The studies of panel data sets considering the effect of different exogenous factors on the 
tax effort and taxable capacity measurements in pre-selected groups of countries suggest that 
Armenia is a low tax collection and low tax effort country. Thus, some of the ratios determined 
by these studies are in the following ranges: collected tax-to GDP from 16.18 to 17.92, taxable 
capacity from 17.1 to 23.61 and tax effort index from 0.71 to 0.84 (Davoodi and Grigorian, 
2007; Le, Moreno-Dodson and Bayraktar, 2012; Cyan, Martinez-Vazquez and Vulovic, 2013; 
Bird, et al., 2014; Khwaja and Iyer, 2014).  
The growing importance of value-added tax (VAT) has been a focal point of many 
studies. Almost 70 percent of the world’s population lives in countries with VAT and this tax 
raises roughly one fourth of all government revenues. The VAT performance is viewed as a 
measurement, which can be impacted by “policy gap” and “compliance gap”. The specific 
design of a policy may reduce the amount of legally available VAT revenue, while the 
administrative weaknesses and constrains may lead to uncollected tax revenues. Similar studies 
of the effect of the VAT regulations and administration on tax revenue mobilization were also 
applied to the case of Armenia (Ebrill et al, 2001; Sedrakyan, 2006; OECD, 2015).   
III.  ESTIMATING POTENTIAL VAT BASE IN AN ECONOMY WITH 
ALTERNATIVE SIMPLIFIED OR PRESUMPTIVE TAXES 
3.1. Methodology  
In this section, we develop a methodology that allows a comprehensive estimation of the 
value-added tax base and potential revenue from VAT in a fiscal environment with two 
presumptive tax modes, simplified tax or presumptive payments, and taking into consideration 
the country’s production of national income and tax institutions. A discussion on three different 
approaches to GDP calculation can be found at McCulla and Smith (2015). Here we use the 
value added approach of GDP estimation. Further, we use the derived data for potential tax 
revenue to estimate the taxable capacity and tax effort indexes.  
We start with addressing the national accounts identity  
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑁𝑋  
Net-export (NX) is a difference between export (EX) and import (IM) activities𝑁𝑋 = 𝐸𝑋 − 𝐼𝑀. 
Armenia is a net-importer, where (𝐼𝑀 − 𝐸𝑋 > 0). All export related activities are exempted 
with the 0% VAT rate and the exporters get refunded all VAT paid in the previous stages of 
production.  In case of import of goods to the territory of Armenia the VAT is calculated at the 
moment of importing these products and a 20% VAT rate is applied. The formula for estimating 
the VAT revenue from foreign trade activities with 20% VAT rate is:   
𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑁𝑋 = (𝐼𝑀 −  𝐸𝑋)  ∗  20 %  
Further, the 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 is the value added produced inside the country. Here we use the 
advantage of the value added approach to GDP calculation, where the value added produced in 
the economy in a given year in Armenia is calculated as 𝐺𝐷𝑃 −  𝑁𝑇 , where NT is net taxes on 
production input (or taxes net of subsidies). Further, in order to promote specific industries or 
sectors of economy the government may exempt some of those sectors from paying VAT. Thus, 
in Armenia- like in many other countries - the agricultural sector is mostly VAT exempt; 
therefore, the value added produced in the agricultural sector is deducted from the VAT base. 
After considering all these specifics of the national tax legislation the formula of the VAT base 
calculation can be written as follows:     
𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 −  𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝑁𝑋𝑖 − ∑ 𝑆𝑛𝑖         (1) 
where,  
𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖 VAT base in the period i 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 Gross Domestic Product in the period i 
𝑁𝑋𝑖                  (IM - EX) in the period i  
𝑆𝑛𝑖 Sector of economy n in the period i with VAT exempt or with 0% VAT rate  
𝑁𝑇𝑖  Net Taxes on production input (without subsidies) in the period i 
Moreover, the tax legislation states there are other taxes that could also contain VAT as 
part of their tax structure or be established as presumptive tax modes to replace VAT, such as 
simplified tax and presumptive payments4. Additionally, in the case of Armenia the government 
introduced patent fees in 2010 and a turnover tax in 2012. The turnover tax is a replacement for 
simplified tax with similar regulation and taxation mechanisms, where the tax base is a business 
turnover for the reported period. The patent fees mainly address services provided by micro 
businesses with a single entrepreneur-taxpayer (no additional employees) and take characteristics 
of presumptive payments, where specific business related indicators are used to estimate the tax 
base (more on presumptive tax modes in Appendix 1). Therefore, if the VAT base estimated in 
the formula above is used for the potential VAT revenue estimation, it will include double 
                                                          
4 Ministry of Finance of Republic of Armenia, (1997). The Republic of Armenia law about taxes.  Ministry of 
Finance of Republic of Armenia, 04.14.1997, AL-107. 
taxation and will overly exagerate the size of the tax base. The simplified tax and presumptive 
payments should also be addressed in the methodology of the estimates of potential VAT base. 
However, in practice it is challenging to determine, for instance, what part of the trade and public 
catering sector is subject to taxation in general tax regime and what part is a subject to simplified 
tax or presumptive payments (more on specifics of taxation of this sector in Figure 1).  
Therefore, in order to neutralize the potential VAT base from the aggregate VAT existent in 
presumptive tax modes, we deduct the portion of VAT that has been collected as part of these 
taxes.      
Potential revenue from VAT from a given economy in a given year is estimated as: 
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖 = (𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) ∗ (𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖 ) − ∑(𝛽𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑚𝑖)    (2) 
𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖   Potential revenue from VAT in the period i 
𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 VAT rate in the period i 
𝑃𝑇𝑚𝑖 Revenue from Presumptive Tax mode m in the period i 
𝛽𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑚𝑖  Recounting rate of VAT in the Presumptive Tax mode m in the period i  
Thus, if applied to Armenia, as there are two defined presumptive tax modes, simplified 
tax and presumptive payments, the formula for the VAT estimate from the aggregate of 
presumptive tax modes, with consideration that the recounting rate of VAT for both taxes is 
60%, can be rewritten as5: 
∑(𝛽𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑚𝑖) = (𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖) ∗ 60% + (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖) ∗ 60%
= 60% ∗ (𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖) 
                                                          
5 Recounting rate is used for assessment of the share of VAT and corporate income tax in presumptive taxes, if the 
company moves from a presumptive to general tax regime during the fiscal year. In Armenia the recounting rate of 
VAT is 60% and corporate income tax is 40% in all presumptive taxes.  Source: Ministry of Finance of Republic of 
Armenia. The RA Laws “On presumptive payments” and “On simplified tax”. 
From the equation (2) the gap in VAT collection is the difference of potential and 
collected VAT.   
This methodology is further used to derive the taxable capacity (𝑇𝐶𝑖) and a tax effort 
index (𝑇𝐸𝐼𝑖)  for VAT. Thus, taxable capacity defines the ratio of tax collection to GDP that 
could have been achieved in the given economy with more sophisticated tax administration 




   (3) 
VAT tax effort index is a ratio between VAT tax effort (𝑇𝐸𝑖) , which is calculated as 
ratio of collected VAT-to GDP, and VAT taxable capacity (𝑇𝐶𝑖) , which is calculated as ratio of 












  (4) 
3.2. Results  
The empirical results are presented in Table 46. The estimates reveal that the potential 
VAT has been continuously growing in the period from 1997 to 2015. Until 2013 collected VAT 
had been lower than the VAT gap or uncollected VAT, which is calculated as a difference of 
potential VAT and collected VAT. However, during the whole studied period, for the first time 
in 2013, collected VAT exceeded the VAT gap estimate, which can be viewed as a somewhat 
positive trajectory for improvements in tax collection efforts (Table 4).  
 Another takeaway is that tax policies in Armenia support a higher potential for VAT 
collection; however, currently there is a large disparity in actual and potential estimates. This 
                                                          
6 The tax estimate for the patent fees is not included in the calculation of the tax potential and tax gap, as the 
collected revenue from this tax has not been provided as a separate line of revenue in the annual state budget reports. 
gives more opportunities for administration efforts to employ more advanced tax mobilization 
techniques.   
 Another interesting specific revealed in this section is the tax administration had been so 
inefficient that potential VAT revenue (taxable capacity) calculated by this methodology exceeds 
actual total tax revenue collection until 2012 (Table 5) as comparison of drawings for taxable 
capacity and tax revenue-to GDP.  This result is supported and directly corresponds with the 
information provided by the World Bank country-report. The report summarizes the challenges 
of tax administration in Armenia, where some of the cited obstacles are low tax-to-GDP ratio for 
the country’s level of income, resulting in a narrow tax base with numerous tax exemptions and a 
weak capacity to detect and penalize tax frauds. Both challenges undermine compliance and 
contribute to widespread tax evasion and informal sector activities (World Bank, 2017).  
 The results derived in this section are robust since the taxable capacity and tax effort 
index derived using the offered new methodology are very close to the estimates derived by 
other studies for the similar period. Thus, Le et al. (2012)’s estimates of taxable capacity and tax 
effort index for Armenia are 23.61 and 0.76, respectively. Cyan, Martinez-Vazquez and Vulovic 
estimated the tax effort index for Armenia as 0.71 and 0.73, based on variant methodologies. 
Khwaja and Iyer assessed the same indexes from the perspective of economic performance 
(taxable capacity 17.10 and tax effort 1.08) and legal framework (taxable capacity 21.96 and tax 
effort 0.84) (Le, et al., 2012; Cyan, et al., 2013; Khwaja and Iyer, 2014).  Tables 4 and 5 present 
estimates derived in this study for the period from 1997 to 2015. Since in this analysis we 
derived the annual estimates of VAT taxable capacity and tax effort index, therefore the average 
estimates mentioned in the cited research papers above could provide guidance; however, they 
should not be equal.   
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE UNIDIRECTIONAL EFFECT OF PRESUMPTIVE TAX 
MODES ON VAT COLLECTION INDICATORS 
4.1. Methodology 
This section examines whether imposition of presumptive tax modes, such as simplified 
tax and presumptive payments, could have resulted in tax avoidance in VAT, consequently 
affecting tax collection measurements. In the previous section we estimated a large discrepancy 
in the volume of actual and potential VAT collection in case of Armenia. Additionally, as we 
have mentioned in the literature review section, a study of an enterprise with similar starting 
conditions defined large levied tax disparities due to a type of a tax mode the firm operated in.  
The analysis concluded that both presumptive taxes in addition to the lower effective tax rates 
were also simpler to comply with internal tax accounting and tax filing to authorities, therefore 
presumptive taxation could have incentivized tax avoidance in Armenia (Sedrakyan, 2007). 
Next, we develop a methodology in order to test whether presumptive taxation contributes to the 
inefficiencies causing reduced tax revenue mobilization in Armenia.  
Basically, we utilize regression analysis to explain the behavior of potential tax collection 
performance, measured as tax effort index and taxable capacity.  The actual revenues from 
presumptive tax modes, simplified tax and presumptive payments, and VAT are used as 
explanatory independent variables and calculated as ratios of GDP. The multiple regressions 
have the following form: 
𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛼1𝑋1 + 𝛼2𝑋2 + 𝛼3𝑋3 + 𝑖      (5) 
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 = 𝑏 +  𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝜖𝑗      (6) 
where, the independent variables below are used in both equations: 
𝑋1    -vector of collected VAT to-GDP ratio  
𝑋2    -vector of collected simplified tax-to GDP ratio 
𝑋3    -vector of collected presumptive payments-to GDP ratio 
 𝑖 and  𝜖𝑗 -standard errors 
𝛼𝑖 and  𝛽𝑗   -vectors of coefficients that influence independent variables 
𝑎 and 𝑏  -constants 
The analysis is performed including periods from 1997 to 2015.  
The null hypothesis for equation (5) suggests that 𝐻0: 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 0 , and the null 
hypothesis for equation (6) test suggests that 𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 0, indicating that coefficients 
associated with the independent variables do not impact the dependent variables. Both 
regressions are using three independent variables and they describe 91.6% of variation in tax 
effort index and 63.19% of variation in taxable capacity with R-squared statistics being equal to 
𝑅2 = 91.6 and 𝑅2 = 63.19, respectively. The 5% critical value for a two-tailed t-statistics test 
with 𝑑𝑓 = 15 is [−2.131; 2.131] and it is derived as 𝑡𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖/𝑆𝐸𝑖  and in order for it to be 
significant it should exceed the critical values for the 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 test. Thus, in both 
regression models the 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 for two independent variables exceeds critical values 
associated with the 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 and those are collected VAT-to GDP and simplified tax-to 
GDP variables. The 𝑝 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 5% defines the significance of a given explanatory variable in 
the model, and, indeed, the p-values associated with collected VAT and simplified tax meet that 
test requirement confirming these variables are significant in both regression models with 





The summary assessment of the OLS simulation results of 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 (TEI) and 
𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 (TC) as dependent variable is presented in the Table 1 below and more 
details are in the Tables 6 and 7 of the Appendix:  
Table 1: Summary statistics of the OLS simulation results corresponding with equations (5) and (6) 
 
Based on the summary statistics in Table 1 above and Table 6 it is said that 1 percentage 
point increase in VAT-to GDP leads on average to 0.044 percent increase in VAT effort index 
and VAT-to GDP is a significant independent variable for estimating TEI, holding all other 
variables constant7. Additionally, 1 percentage point increase in the ratio of simplified tax-to 
GDP leads on average to 0.10 percent increase in VAT effort index and simplified tax is a 
significant independent variable for estimating TEI, holding all other variables constant. 
Presumptive payments mode does not have a significant effect on TEI.  
Similarly, based on the summary statistics in Table 1 above and Table 7 it is said that 1 
percentage point increase in VAT-to GDP leads to 0.55 percent increase in VAT taxable capacity 
and VAT-to GDP is a significant independent variable for estimating TC. Additionally, 1 
percentage point increase in the ratio of simplified tax-to GDP leads to 4 percent decline in VAT 
taxable capacity and simplified tax-to GDP is a significant independent variable for estimating 
TC. Presumptive payments mode does not have a significant effect on TEI. We can also observe 
                                                          
7 Note, in this study: 𝑇𝐸𝑖 = 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 =
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝐴𝑇
𝐺𝐷𝑃


















to GDP (X2) 
Pres. Pay.-to 
GDP (X3) 
Coefficient 0.04 0.10 -0.03 0.55 -4.00 0.99 
Standard error 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.15 1.20 0.89 
a higher magnitude of the effect of presumptive tax modes on taxable capacity than on tax effort 
index.  
To further unravel the multiple regression results with regards to the effect of simplified 
tax on the tax effort index we refer to the main definition of TEI, from (4), where TEI is a ratio 












    (7) 
The positive sign of 𝑇𝐸𝐼𝑖 ratio can be a result of two cases, when both nominator and 
denominator are positive or when both are negative. After closer review of the effect of 
simplified tax in multiple regression outcomes (Tables 6 and 7) the intuition suggests that if the 
simplified tax has such a significant and negative effect on taxable capacity (𝑇𝐶𝑖), and because 
the same simplified tax has a significant positive effect on tax effort index (𝑇𝐸𝐼𝑖), then in order 
to reach this positive significant effect in 𝑇𝐸𝐼𝑖, the tax effort (𝑇𝐸𝑖) or ratio of collected VAT-to 
GDP should also be negative. In order to test for this information we conduct another OLS 
regression, where (𝑇𝐸𝑖) is a dependent variable and ratios of simplified tax and presumptive 
payments to GDP, TEI and TC are independent variables (Table 7a) and the summary of 
coefficients and standard errors are presented in the Table 2 below: 
Table 2: Summary statistics of the OLS simulation testing effect on VAT-to GDP ratio 
Dependent 
variable 











Coefficient 0.01 0.04 17.27 0.43 
Standard error 0.08 0.05 0.18 0.01 
 
The results from new multiple regression analysis suggest that while the simplified tax 
has a positive coefficient (0.01); however, this variable is insignificant to explain the VAT-to 
GDP ratio. Therefore, while the math behind the intuition associated with equation (7) suggests 
that the effect of simplified tax-to GDP on VAT-to GDP is rather negative; however, OLS 
regression does not provide enough evidence to support it. This outcome singles out a case, 
where analysis of only tax effort index alone would mislead researchers, since would point out 
on positive effect of simplified tax on tax effort index. In reality, while mathematically this value 
is positive; however, this outcome is reached because both components: the numerator and 
denominator of the division equation have negative signs.  
Applied to economics, both components of division equation (7) are tax performance 
measurements and therefore additional investigation is needed to identify their effect more 
precisely. Based on the results from the TC regression analysis (Table 7) we can summarize that 
even a small increase in simplified tax leads to a substantial tax base erosion associated with 
general tax regime through business subdivision, bribery and other techniques to reduce turnover 
and continue being taxed in simplified tax with lower tax rates and more relaxed compliance 
regulations. Additionally, based on the results of regression, where TE is a dependent variable 
(Table 7a), since the effect of simplified tax on actual VAT collection is insignificant, we can 
assume that tax administration mechanisms to improve VAT collection do not contribute to the 
effort of reducing VAT avoidance through targeting the tax loopholes induced by specifics of 
regulations in simplified tax. One of the main characteristics of the simplified tax is a similar to 
VAT tax base, which is gross sales in the reported period, where an enterprise with lower sales is 
being taxed via the simplified tax. The similarity in tax base calculation can facilitate the VAT 
base erosion. In that, only very thorough tax audit and surveillance at the enterprise site can 
detect tax avoidance and this work is time and resource consuming exercise. Therefore, this is an 
issue to resolve by addressing simplified tax regulations rather than tax administration strategies.              
A similar test of the effect of presumptive payments on measurements of potential VAT 
collection is applied through the division components of TEI. The results of the multiple 
regression analysis are presented in the Table 7a of the Appendix and the summary of 
coefficients is in the Table 2 above. The effect of presumptive payments on TEI is insignificant 
and negative with coefficient estimate potentially taking any result in the range 
between[−0.075: 0.0203], with 95% confidence interval is used (Table 6). Similarly, both 
components of TEI, as taxable capacity and tax effort, also have insignificant effect on VAT 
measurements (Tables 7 and 7a).   
Thus, the all three tests identifying whether the presumptive payments mode have any 
significant effect on VAT actual or potential performance measurements suggest there is no 
considerable relation occurring from the change in presumptive payments-to GDP ratio. Here, 
we can summarize that presumptive payments targeting specific business activities is a viable tax 
mobilization tool, which does not affect VAT collection measurements. The tax regulations 
addressing presumptive payments are well-defined and they do not to contradict with general tax 
mode. The tax administration mechanisms targeting to improve tax mobilization will be useful 
for increasing tax revenues in both VAT and presumptive payments.        
Similarly, if tested for the effect of actual VAT collection on VAT tax effort index and 
taxable capacity, both measurements of potential tax collection performance are positive and 
significant. This is an expected result meaning that VAT regulations support higher tax 
collection and the improvement of tax administration strategies and tools will positively 
contribute in both actual and potential VAT collection (Tables 6 and 7).     
 
 
V.  STUDIES OF BIDIRECTIONAL CAUSALITY BETWEEN VAT AND 
PRESUMPTIVE TAXES  
5.1 Methodology 
 This section disentangles further the effects that presumptive taxation may have on VAT 
collections and some specifics on how the changes in VAT may impact presumptive taxes, using 
the study horizon of 18 periods. The Vector Autoregression (VAR) methodology is used for the 
analysis. A standard practice in this methodology is to report results of Granger causality test for 
conducting short-term analysis and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) and 
Impulse-Response Function (IRF) tests for studying the long-term interactions of variables 
(Stock and Watson, 2001).  In order to use VAR function there are preliminary conditions that 
the time-series and the VAR function should satisfy. The time series should meet stationarity 
requirements, which we determine by applying Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADT) test. Also, 
before proceeding with causality tests, we examine the VAR function on stability, 
autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity.     
 VAR is used as a preliminary step for running other tests in the system to further define 
causal (in our case focusing specifically on bidirectional) behavior of the multivariate time series 
in the short and long-term perspectives. This test includes a system of OLS equations where each 
variable is treated as endogenous, provided that the model includes enough lags of all variables 
and the equations satisfy the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation assumptions for time series 
regression. The VAR function models time series in terms of their past and each equation 
includes an error that has zero expected value given past information on studied variables. Thus, 
for defining the effect of all other studied variables on VAT- to GDP the VAR builds the 
following equation:  
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜕0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑋𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑍𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜗𝑗𝑇𝐸𝐼𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 +  ∑ 𝜇𝑗𝑇𝐶𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 + 𝑖  (8) 
Further, for defining the causal effect of all other studied variables on Simplified tax- to GDP the 
VAR builds equation: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝛿0 +  ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝑋𝑡−𝑗 +  ∑ 𝜌𝑗𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝜎𝑗𝑍𝑡−𝑗 +  ∑ 𝜏𝑗𝑇𝐸𝐼𝑡−𝑗
𝑚








𝑗=1  (8a)  
For current study VAR function analyzes total of five OLS equations, where remaining three 
(𝑍𝑡, 𝑇𝐸𝐼𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐶𝑡) variables are presented similar to the equations (8) and (8a) with 𝑙𝑎𝑔 = 2.      
Where 𝑋𝑡, 𝑌𝑡,𝑍𝑡,𝑇𝐸𝐼𝑡,𝑇𝐶𝑡, are stationary time series and  
𝑋𝑡- 𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 
𝑌𝑡- 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 
𝑍𝑡- 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 
𝑇𝐸𝐼𝑡- 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 
𝑇𝐶𝑡- 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 
𝛼𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗 , 𝛾𝑗 , 𝜗𝑗 , 𝜇𝑗, 𝜋𝑗 , 𝜌𝑗 , 𝜎𝑗 , 𝜏𝑗𝜑𝑗 – vectors of coefficients  
𝑖, 𝜖𝑖    –error terms   
𝑡- 2015 (tests using VAR are modeled for the period from 1997 to 2015)  
In ADF test the null hypothesis assumes the variable contains a unit root, and the 
alternative is that the variable is generated by a stationary process. We apply 5% critical value as 
a significance level for the test results. In our analysis while the majority of the data is stationary 
at levels, the tax effort index (𝑇𝐸𝐼) turns stationary at first difference (Table 8). Therefore, the 
VAR function associated tests in this section are performed using first differenced data. Further, 
we apply a series of tests to confirm whether the properties of specifications have been well-
defined. Thus, the outcomes for LM and Eigenvalue stability condition tests are presented in 
Tables 9 and 10 confirming that the model specifications are well-defined. There is no 
autocorrelation at lag order and VAR function satisfies stability conditions. Furthermore, for 
heteroscedasticity investigation and as the Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg does not run a multi-
system OLS equation as VAR does, the multi-system OLS equation is separated into five 
separate OLS equations. Each of five studied variables is used as a dependent variable and other 
four variables as independent and regressed as an OLS equation, where Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-
Weisberg heteroscedasticity test results satisfy homoscedasticity conditions.  
We use Granger causality test to define short-term causality of endogenous variables 
(Granger, 1969). The simple model with two endogenous variables can be written as:  




𝑗=1                            (9) 






The 𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌 are stationary time series, as per ADF test results we use first-differenced data. The 
null hypothesis of the test for unidirectional causality is that all past values of 𝑌𝑡  do not cause 𝑋𝑡 
and can be written as  𝐻0: 𝑏𝑗 = 0 , or in other words, the coefficient associated with 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 is 0. If 
probability 𝜌 < 5 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡, we can reject the null hypothesis, which would mean there is a short-
run causality running from 𝑌𝑡 to 𝑋𝑡. Additionally, if we define a situation, where 𝑌𝑡 causes 𝑋𝑡, and 
simultaneously 𝑋𝑡 causes 𝑌𝑡, where 𝐻0: 𝑏𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗 = 0, there is said to be a feedback relationship 
between 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡 meeting bidirectional Granger causality hypothesis requirements, if 𝜌 <
5 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 for both variables (Granger, 1969).  The results of Granger causality test are in the 
Table 11. Thus, for variable 𝑋𝑡 discussed in the equation 8 the null hypothesis of Granger 
causality test is that all other variables with the lag=2 do not cause 𝑋𝑡 and can be written as  
𝐻0: 𝛼𝑗 =  𝛽𝑗 =  𝛾𝑗 =  𝜗𝑗 =  𝜇𝑗 = 0 , suggesting that coefficients associated with other 
endogenous variables are 0. When the estimate of 𝜌 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 5 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 significance level, we 
can reject the null hypothesis and declare significant causal relation running from a given 
endogenous variable to 𝑋𝑡. For bidirectional causality the null hypothesis considering (8) and (8a) 
is  𝐻0: 𝛽𝑗 =  𝜋𝑗 = 0, suggesting feedback relation of variables 𝑋𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑡.  The same intuition is 
applied when summarizing the test outcomes for other variables in the equations (8), (8a), etc. 
described earlier in this section. 
 
Finally, the impulse-response function (IRF) and forecast error variance decomposition 
(FEVD) tests are used for studying the long-term effect of presumptive methods of taxation on 
VAT collection, and conversely. In 1980 Sims proposed the IRF and FEVD tests as essential part 
of VAR methodology and the both techniques are important tools in interpreting the studied VAR 
model in long-term perpective (Sims, 1980). These tests track the evolution of the shock through 
the VAR system (Swanson and Granger, 1997). The IRF method defines response of a studied 
variable to a unit change, which can be described as shock or innovation, in the value of one of 
the VAR errors. Assuming that all other errors are zero, then the studied VAR error would return 
to zero in further periods. More formally, if a VAR system presented in equations (8), (8a), etc.  
is considered with a time-lag (𝑡 − 𝑗) the IRF identifies the responsiveness of the endogenous 
variables in the system when a unit shock or impulse is applied to the error terms 𝑖and 𝜖𝑖.    
The FEVD method estimates the percentage of the variance of the error in each of the 
forecasted variables, which can be explained by shocks to other variables in the same VAR 
system. Both tests are based on the VAR function applied to the equations described in (8) and 
(8a) with 𝑙𝑎𝑔 = 2.  
 
 
5.2. Results  
The summary statistics of Granger causality is reported in Table 11 and the same table 
presents a separate section of the indicators meeting bi-directional causality hypothesis 
requirements discussed in the methodology section.  
Thus, based on the results presented in Table 11 the causal effect of other variables on 
actual VAT collection is insignificant, except for simplified tax. The intuition here would be:  if 
presumptive taxes are effectively designed in consideration to VAT, the test should not detect 
significant unidirectional Granger causality, since these are supplemental tools to mobilize extra 
revenues in addition to actual collected VAT.  To the contrary, we would expect actual VAT-to-
GDP perform a significant unidirectional causality to both presumptive taxation modes. This is 
due to design of both presumptive taxation modes, which have VAT in their tax structures. The 
methodological specifics of designs of presumptive taxes were discussed in section 4.1 and 
Appendix 1.  The test results confirm that, indeed, VAT has a significant causal effect on both 
presumptive taxes, where simplified tax (p-value is 0.027 or 2.7 percent) and presumptive 
payments (p-value is 0.00) have a  p-value below 5 percent and we can reject the null hypothesis.       
A short-run causality running from simplified tax to VAT (p-value is 0.049 or 4.9 
percent) is revealed, suggesting that the design of simplified tax in consideration to actual VAT 
is not effective. There is also a short-run Granger causality from VAT to simplified tax (p-value is 
0.027). This is an example of bi-directional causality hypothesis, which asserts feedback relation 
running from simplified tax to VAT, and conversely. Moreover, there is a causal effect running 
from tax effort index (p-value 0.028) and taxable capacity (p-value 0.048) to simplified tax and 
the latter is bi-directional, which shows that change in simplified tax causes change in taxable 
capacity (p-value 0.008), and vice versa.  
As a summary, we can assert that VAT actual and potential collections have a significant 
impact on the simplified tax. Further, as we have estimated from 4.2, the effect of simplified tax 
on potential VAT collection is negative. These two pieces of information suggest that the 
simplified tax has been used as a tax avoidance tool. Thus, the simplified tax significantly 
declines, when measurements to improve potential tax collection are implemented. If the efforts 
of formal VAT disclosure are exhausted, it contributes to a substantial increase in simplified tax, 
which, as we have seen previously, is achieved by tax base erosion, subdivision of enterprises and 
other tax avoidance techniques. Moreover, the bi-directionality of simplified tax and actual VAT 
suggests that these taxes are used interchangeably. Further, the feedback relation can also be a 
result of factors having a short-term effect on both taxes, such as economic development, tax 
reforms contributing to the promotion of new businesses, etc. Thus, since both taxes have a 
similar tax base, the start-ups with lower turnover register as simplified taxpayers, while the new 
organizations with more sophisticated operations and higher turnover are required by law to 
register their operations in general mode of tax reporting and pay VAT. However, the latter ones 
tend to report lower turnover and take advantage of simplified tax mode. Therefore, the inverse 
bidirectional effect between simplified tax and VAT taxable capacity can be explained if we 
consider one of the main objectives for simplified tax to be promotion of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), in anticipation of increased tax revenue streams in the future, when the firms 
become larger and more stable, so they can be taxed in general tax mode. However, when they 
become larger, instead of paying due VAT they use tax avoidance tools and continue their 
operations in the simplified tax. Additionally, a time lag over which the tax authorities reveal 
informal operations and omitted information in business reporting contributes to the negative 
feedback relation between VAT taxable capacity and simplified tax. Here, we can assume that the 
simplified tax created tax loopholes and was used as a tax avoidance tool. 
While all studied indicators have an effect on presumptive payments (p-value is 0), 
except for simplified tax (p-value is 0.059),  however, presumptive payments only have an effect 
on taxable capacity (p-value is 0.012 ) and this causal relation is also consistent with the bi-
derctional causality hypothesis. Therefore, the intuition suggests that any efforts to improve actual 
or potential VAT also positively contribute to mobilization of presumptive payments. Therefore, 
in addition to measures for improved taxable capacity, such as economic development, tax 
reforms, etc., other upturns, such as enhanced tax administration techniques, introduction of tax 
surveillance measurements, etc., that have positive effect on actual VAT will also positively 
contribute to collection of presumptive payments. Here, we can assume that presumptive taxes 
serve as an effective supplemental tax collection tool.   
Furthermore, only actual collected VAT-to GDP ratio (p-value is 0.007) and taxable 
capacity (p-value is 0.009) have a short term causal effect on tax effort index (TEI), which shows 
that presumptive tax modes have an indirect impact on TEI. If the discussion of TEI from section 
4.2 and equation (7) is recalled that indirect impact from presumptive taxes is affecting TEI 
measurement either through TE (tax effort) or TC (taxable capacity) ratios.  
 Finally, the Granger causality test results confirm that taxable capacity, by performing 
bidirectional causality with all studied measurements (except for VAT ratio (p-value is 0.339)),  
indicates the complex character of this metrics that can be affected by both studied in the VAR 
tests variables and externalities, which are considered in designing the methodology of our study 
in section 3.1, such as GDP, net taxes, sectors of net-export, agriculture, VAT rate, tax rates and 
VAT recounting rates in presumptive modes. And because VAT taxable capacity is such a 
complex indicator, any fiscal reforms and refinements of tax administration techniques targeted to 
increase this measure will also significantly impact presumptive tax modes in the economy. 
However, as we saw above when describing causality specifics of presumptive tax modes, for the 
simplified tax the direction of the effect is an inverse one, while for presumptive payments it is 
direct. This difference is due to a design of how the tax base for each presumptive tax mode is 
generated, enabling in some instances inefficiencies and creating tax loopholes.     
 The discussion of IRF and FEVD tests results are summing-up our studies of the 
bidirectional effects of presumptive taxation mechanisms and measurements of VAT actual and 
potential collection (Tables 12 and 13 respectively). Here we discuss a long-term effect of 
presumptive taxation modes on VAT, and conversely. The forecast horizon for both tests is 18 
periods. The IRF test results analyze situations when a unit shock or impulse is given to the error 
term of one of the variables in the VAR system, and the corresponding response received by 
other variables (Table 12). On the Table 12 in the title of each figure the first variable is an 
impulse and the second variable is a response to the unit shock.  
 Thus, first row of Table 12 represents the IRF test results for equation (8), where a unit 
shock or innovation is given to the error term  𝑖  of  𝑋𝑡 or actual VAT-to GDP ratio and four 
figures of the first raw are the corresponding responses of each variable in the VAR system.  
Similar intuition is applied to conduct the IRF test on other variables in the VAR system.  
 A unit shock given to the error term of actual VAT-to GDP ratio leads to a 
negative response in the simplified tax, which declines significantly and this negative response 
lasts for 5 periods (Table 12, first test outcome). Presumptive payments-to GDP ratio positively 
reacts to the unit shock in actual VAT-to GDP ratio in period 1, in period 2 it declines, further 
recovers and stays neutral starting period 5 onward.  A unit shock in actual VAT-to GDP ratio 
leads to a single-period decline in tax effort index and then it recovers and stays positive until 
period 7. A unit innovation in actual VAT has a strong and long-lasting effect on taxable 
capacity. This information asserts that simplified tax has a long-term negative response to any 
improvements in actual VAT. Similar positive change has a smaller magnitude effect on 
presumptive payments, which take time to adjust, followed by neutral reaction. Significant 
improvement in taxable capacity confirms that a small positive change in the tax system, fiscal 
policy or tax administration of VAT today will have a significant and long-lasting impact (5 
periods) in potential tax collection. Consideration of the time horizon that an economic indicator 
reacts to a unit change in another indicator is also very significant for tax managers since this 
information can serve as guidance for implementation of reforms and innovations based on the 
time-appropriate schedules associated with specific goals.      
 A unit shock given to the error term of simplified tax-to GDP ratio leads to a 
negative and significant response from actual VAT-to GDP ratio and it lasts for more than 10 
periods. Response of actual VAT-to GDP, tax effort, and taxable capacity on a positive shock in 
simplified tax-to GDP ratio is very interesting, especially if considered our discussion from 
section 4.2 These three tables (Table 12, row 2) visually demonstrate our empirical discussion of 
the essence of tax effort index. Here we see that while VAT-to GDP and taxable capacity have a 
significant negative magnitude of reaction to a small shock or improvement in simplified tax, the 
tax effort index does not perform significant negativity and its variation is only in the range of (-
0.2; 0.2), in comparison the range of magnitude of the same innovation on both VAT-to GDP 
and taxable capacity is (-6;5) with the values predominantly being below 0 over the 10 year time-
horizon. The negative effect of simplified tax to actual VAT defined in this test is also essential, 
since previously conducted OLS and Granger causality tests did not provide significant evidence 
to prove this point. With this test we have enough econometric evidence to support intuition in 
equation (7) of section 4.2 concerning negative sign of both nominator and denominator. 
Presumptive payments take two periods to adjust to the shock in simplified tax and perform 
neutrality starting period 3 onward.  
  A unit shock given to the error term of presumptive payments-to GDP ratio 
leads to another interesting outcome. Again, the response of actual VAT-to GDP, tax effort, and 
taxable capacity to a positive shock in presumptive payments-to GDP ratio is reviewed in the 
frame of our discussion from section 4.2. These three tables (Table 12, row 3) confirm that 
presumptive payments do not distort the tax base of VAT.  Any improvements in presumptive 
payments, such as more effective tax administration, lead to the increase in actual and potential 
VAT.  Interestingly, VAT capacity immediately and positively responds to a positive impulse in 
presumptive payments; however, actual VAT-to GDP takes two periods to adjust and the 
adjustment leads to a decline in tax effort index for two periods.  
 The reaction of actual and potential VAT measurements to unit shocks in ratios of 
simplified tax and presumptive payments-to GDP contrasts two cases. In one case a positive 
shock in a presumptive tax has a long-term distortive impact (simplified tax regime). In another 
case, a positive shock to a presumptive tax leads to a short-term adjustment in VAT 
measurements and react positively moving forward (presumptive payments).       
 From the graphs associated with the effect of VAT and the two presumptive taxes on a 
unit innovation in taxable capacity shows that actual VAT-to GDP has a higher magnitude of 
response and first response is positive, then it declines and stays negative. This can be interpreted 
as taxpayers follow tax compliance rules and pay VAT in the period 1, then they try to identify 
loopholes or avoid paying VAT tax all together. The graphs associated with simplified tax and 
presumptive payments confirm this assumption: simplified tax goes up in the same period with 
unit innovation in taxable capacity and presumptive payments increase starting period 2, while 
VAT declines, which also proves that tax surveillance mechanisms are not efficient to bind 
taxpayers to follow adopted tax regulations. Additionally, if we recall that improvement in 
simplified tax leads to further decline in both actual and potential VAT, we can summarize that 
any VAT reforms targeted to increase VAT mobilization will not be sustainable and will be 
contributing to tax avoidance through simplified tax.         
 The responses of studied variables for tax collection to a unit innovation in tax effort 
index replicate pattern already discussed for the case of taxable capacity with much higher 
magnitude of response.  
 Based on the FEVD test results the power of actual VAT has the strongest effect on the 
variance of forecast error of all remaining variables considered (Table 13). The power of 
simplified tax has comparatively strong effect on the variance of error in actual VAT, tax effort 
index and taxable capacity. The power of presumptive payments is attributed to the variance 
forecast error of simplified tax and taxable capacity. The powers of taxable capacity and tax 
effort index do not have an effect on variance of forecast error in all three taxes in period 1, 
which shows that efforts taken to improve potential tax revenue indicators do not lead to 
immediate results. In case of actual VAT the actual change is seen in period 2, in case of 
presumptive payments in period 3 and in case of simplified tax in period 5.  Moreover, the power 
of VAT effort index and taxable capacity has a stronger effect on ratio of presumptive payments-
to GDP than ratio of VAT-to GDP, which can be assumed that improvement of tax compliance 
and administration mechanisms in VAT also highly attribute to the revenue mobilization in 
presumptive payments.     
 The IRF and FEVD test results support our hypothesis that, indeed, there is a significant 
causal relation running from simplified tax-to GDP to actual VAT-to GDP. In addition, this 
section has defined that relation meets bidirectional causality hypothesis requirements and the 
relation between these two tax collection indicators is an inverse one. The same is true in the 
case of bidirectional inverse relation between simplified tax-to GDP and VAT taxable capacity 
and in both cases it has a long term effect. Additionally, over time the negative effect of the 
simplified tax on taxable capacity is strengthening while the effect of actual VAT is weakening. 
This consolidated information suggests that simplified tax has a highly distortive effect on VAT 
collection and over time this negative influence growth stronger. It also suggests that efforts to 
improve tax collection in VAT are ineffective and only cause more taxpayers to seek tax 
loopholes and to switch to simplified tax mode. Our final result suggesting ineffectiveness of 
simplified tax as presumptive tax mechanism in Armenia corresponds with some of the study 
results conducted in other ECA countries (World Bank, 2011; Engelschalk and Loeprick, 2015).      
 In contrast to the ineffectiveness of simplified tax mode, the study also defines that 
presumptive payments have been useful and effective presumptive tax mode. Thus, the long-term 
positive feedback relation of presumptive payments and VAT taxable capacity suggests that tax 
reforms and administrative efforts to improve collections in one of the taxes lead to an improved 
revenue collection in the other.  Additionally, the impact of presumptive payments on VAT 





VI.  CONCLUSION 
 This study offered a comprehensive analysis of the impact of presumptive taxation modes 
on VAT and estimated that a poor design of a presumptive tax may have a very distortive impact 
on the budget revenue streams and encourage tax avoidance and evasion. There is a risk of 
creating taxes that over time transform from being a presumptive tax to becoming an 
interchangeable one with much beneficial tax features. The more beneficial tax features in the 
environment of ineffective tax administration may over time distort the efficiency of the whole 
tax system and create tax loopholes. This is especially important, when the capacity of revenues 
from presumptive taxes is significantly lower from the tax revenues in general taxes by yielding 
tremendous budget revenue reductions. Hence, in the environment, where presumptive and 
general tax modes have inverse bidirectional feedback, it would be more helpful to review the 
presumptive tax legislation and amend the features which caused the negative feedback relation. 
The case study applied to Armenia revealed that the tax design of simplified tax that replicated 
the tax base for VAT led to distortion of the tax system. To the contrary, the effect of 
presumptive payments (different from VAT tax base) on VAT was positive in the long-run, 
suggesting that presumptive payments did not distort VAT revenue streams and reforms in one 
tax also contributed to the increased revenues in another tax.   
 The offered new methodology for assessment of a true potential VAT base not only 
defined a comprehensive nature of taxable capacity as a derivative of potential VAT base 
(section 3.1), but also contributed in our understanding of the effect of presumptive taxes on 
VAT. Due to the methodology design, ideally, it is expected not to identify a statistical 
significance running from presumptive tax modes to VAT taxable capacity. This neutrality 
assesses that presumptive tax modes are well-designed and do not impact potential VAT 
mobilization efforts. Another positive case scenario is a situation of a positive relation of 
presumptive tax modes in association with VAT taxable capacity, suggesting that fiscal reforms 
in presumptive taxes also will positively contribute to VAT taxable capacity. This effect will 
show that while these two tax modes are not completely independent from each other; however, 
they tend to improve the overall budget revenues. Nevertheless, it is highly undesirable to derive 
a situation, where a presumptive tax performs a statistically significant inverse impact on VAT 
taxable capacity, suggesting that any improvements targeted to increase VAT base and potential 
VAT collection push a large number of taxpayers to avoid taxes by using tax legislation 
loopholes for getting lower tax rates and more simple tax filing routine offered by the 
presumptive tax. The case analysis applied to Armenia describing causality specifics of 
presumptive tax modes on VAT taxable capacity derived two of mentioned situations; it detected 
a direct order in case of presumptive payments and an inverse order in case of simplified tax.  
 Finally, this study assessed that in the context of a single country study, if tax effort index 
is used to assess the effect of presumptive taxation on VAT mobilization, it would be more 
useful to evaluate separately tax effort and then taxable capacity. As, in some instances, both 
division components of a tax effort index may have negative signs yielding a misleading positive 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ADF  -Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
AMD  -Armenian Dram (currency used in Republic of Armenia) 
C  -Consumption 
ECA  -Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
EX  -Export 
FEVD   -Forecast Errors Variance Decomposition 
G  -Government Spending 
GDP  -Gross Domestic Product 
I  -Investments 
IM  -Import 
IMF  -International Monetary Fund 
IRF  -Impulse-Response Function 
LM test -Lagrange multiplier test 
NI  -Net Import 
NT  -Net Taxes 
NX  -Net Export 
OLS  -Ordinary Least Square 
PT  -Presumptive Tax 
Sni  -Sector of Economy 
Sq.m   -Square Meter 
SME  -Small and Medium Enterprises 
TE  -Tax Effort  
TEI  -Tax Effort Index 
TC   -Taxable Capacity 
VAR  -Vectot Autoregression Function 
VAT  -Value Added Tax 
ANNEXES 
Appendix 1. Comparison of general and presumptive tax modes  
Every sector of the economy in Armenia can be taxed in one of the three tax modes: 
general (combination of VAT and corporate income tax), simplified tax and presumptive 
payments. Simplified tax and presumptive payments are supplemental tools for generating 
additional revenue streams and in this study are referred as presumptive tax 
modes/mechanisms. Enterprises with similar starting terms, depending upon in which tax 
mode they operate, will have different tax liabilities8. Thus, the discrepancy of tax burden 
in simplified tax and general tax mode reaches more than 23 percent, if the profitability of 
organizations changes from 10 percent to 80 percent9.   
The main characteristics of tax modes are the following10:  
The tax base for VAT and simplified tax is gross sales. Simplified tax mode is more 
focused on small and small-to-medium entrepreneurs (annual ceiling is 50 million AMD11), 
based on the quarterly volume of the sales. If the quarterly volume of sales exceeds the 
government’s estimates then the business is automatically transferred to the general tax mode. 
The VAT counts for 60% and corporate income tax for 40% of the tax collection.  
The presumptive payments mode targets specific industries or business activities, 
as such auto-transportation services, public catering, casinos, etc. are taxed in presumptive 
payments. Depends on the type of service the tax base of presumptive payments differs and 
it can be calculated based on particular business related parameters, as such  the number of 
vehicles used in the auto-transportation service, the location and size of the area for catering 
service, etc. Similar to simplified tax, in presumptive payments the share of VAT counts 
60% of collection, and the share of corporate income tax is 40%, respectively.  
For both presumptive tax modes the tax rates are lower, the tax accounting and 
procedure of submission of tax returns to the authorities is substantially simplified.  
The general taxes are applied to all other business activities. The taxpayers are taxed 
separately at a 20% VAT and 20% corporate income tax rate. Tax calculation and 
submission is more complex here, especially for large taxpayers.  
In 2010 and in 2012 the government introduced two new taxes: patent fee and 
turnover tax, respectively. The tax base accounting for patent fee is very similar to 
presumptive payments; however, it targets specific extra-small business activities with a 
single owner-employee. Turnover tax is a replacement for simplified tax and as such this 
study views the revenue collected from turnover tax as simplified tax starting from 2013.  
                                                          
8 Bearing Point, 2002. Review of tax policies and tax legislation in Armenia. Prepared by Bearing Point based on 
remarks by tax policy work groups. (12.25.2002), Armenia pp 221-223  
9 Sedrakyan, G., 2007. Reasons of reserves arising in RA tax relations and mechanisms to avoid them. Armenia: 
Finances and Economics, 1 (78), 01/2007.   
10 Ministry of Finance of Republic of Republic of Armenia, The RA Laws “On presumptive payments”, “On 
simplified tax”,  “On the value added tax”, “On the patent fees”, and “On turnover tax”. 
11 AMD is a national currency of Republic of Armenia, for comparison the USD/AMD exchange rate on 04.12.2017 
is 1USD=486AMD 
Table 1. Contribution of total tax revenues and VAT-to GDP and ratios of VAT and presumptive 
taxes in total tax revenues 
 
 
Table 2. Annual change in GDP, tax revenues, and actual and potential VAT measurements 
 
Table 3.  Ratio of tax effort from presumptive taxes12  
                                                          
12 Ratio of actual tax collection-to GDP. Data sources: National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia. The 
statistical yearbook of Armenia, years from 2001 (1996-1998) to 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator and 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/revenue-statistics-2016_rev_stats-2016-en-fr 
Table 4. Estimates of VAT tax effort index and VAT taxable capacity (in national currency, AMD)** 13 
 
**Notes: 
VAT rate applied to value added produced in sectors of manufacturing, service provision and net import is 20% 
The recounting rate of VAT in alternative taxes is 60% 
 
Table 5. Selective measurements for tax collection performance 
 
 
                                                          
13 Tax effort index and taxable capacity are estimated based on the methodology described in the Section 3.1 of this paper, which offers a new approach for 
potential tax revenue estimation 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Tax effort index 0.2711442 0.3833197 0.3952439 0.3613615 0.422523 0.4491405 0.4118296 0.40023 0.4049689 0.373482 0.4532841 0.4738064 0.4142031 0.462524 0.4797549 0.4753187 0.502368 0.5250266 0.50918
Taxable capacity 17.152931 16.250161 17.492516 17.916163 16.005517 15.525355 16.107562 15.440438 16.160106 16.724297 17.376503 18.828003 19.531063 18.852766 18.123527 18.227773 17.560379 17.370181 16.54543
Collected VAT 37409 59511 68270 66771 79521 95006 107769 117903 146783 165912.2 248007.1 318313 254158.1 301724.5 328482.8 369661.6 401884.7 440361.4 423933.5
(GDP-Agriculture-Net Taxes)*20% 76847.2 92960.6 118368.8 131160.2 142243.76 170599.22 211360 246540 309580 373460 438120 505300 455115 496039 518803.88 608833.28 641870.18 681932.08 725483.4
Net Import *20% 61120 64640 57360 56040 48620 46940 58100 59400 64700 84420 125760 182760 172980 169460 178300 177768.9 180748.98 178479.62 123185.9
(Presumptive Payments + Simplified 
Tax+Turnover Tax)*60%
0 2349 3000 2424 2658.6 6010.74 7776.54 11351.88 11824.98 13649.22 16746.06 16239.18 14487.6 13155.6 12415.14 8889.06 22638.54 21670.56 16088.52
Potential VAT 137967.2 155251.6 172728.8 184776.2 188205.16 211528.48 261683.46 294588.12 362455.02 444230.78 547133.94 671820.82 613607.4 652343.4 684688.74 777713.12 799980.62 838741.14 832580.78
Figure 1. Specifics of taxation in the sector of trade and public catering14 
                                                          
14 Sources: Ministry of Finance of Republic of Republic of Armenia. The RA Laws “On presumptive payments”, 
“On simplified tax”, “On the value added tax” all three are legislations of Republic of Armenia associated with the 
specifics of taxation in the sector of trade and public catering.  
Trade and public catering 
 (specification by taxpayer types ) 
General Tax Mode 
Simplified Tax 
Trade through stores, 
kiosks (pavilions) 
Entities, where total 
revenue from supply of 
goods and services does 
not exceed (not including 
VAT) 50 mln. AMD in 
previous year operations 
Other Presumptive Payments 
Trade areas not 
exceeding 30 sq. meters, 
such as stores, kiosks 
(pavilions) 
Activities related to 
organizing area for trade 
usually referred to 
markets 
Public catering   
Presumptive Tax Modes 
effective since 08/01/1998  effective since 07/01/2000  
Table 6. VAT tax effort index OLS regression results 
 
Table 7.  VAT taxable capacity OLS regression results 
 
 
Table 7a. Effect of studied variables on VAT effort (ratio of collected VAT-to GDP)  
 
                                                                                          
                   _cons     .0991428    .028608     3.47   0.003     .0381663    .1601193
PresumptivePaymentsinGDP    -.0272445   .0223056    -1.22   0.241    -.0747878    .0202988
      SimplifiedTaxinGDP     .0991458   .0301199     3.29   0.005     .0349467    .1633449
       CollectedVATinGDP     .0441436   .0036392    12.13   0.000     .0363868    .0519004
                                                                                          
          Taxeffortindex        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
       Total    .067627401        18  .003757078   Root MSE        =    .01946
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.8992
    Residual    .005682706        15  .000378847   R-squared       =    0.9160
       Model    .061944695         3  .020648232   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(3, 15)        =     54.50
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        19
                                                                                          
                   _cons     13.32014   1.143468    11.65   0.000      10.8829    15.75739
PresumptivePaymentsinGDP      .993104   .8915599     1.11   0.283     -.907211    2.893419
      SimplifiedTaxinGDP    -3.996732   1.203899    -3.32   0.005    -6.562783   -1.430681
       CollectedVATinGDP     .5500988   .1454597     3.78   0.002     .2400588    .8601387
                                                                                          
         Taxablecapacity        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
       Total    24.6667596        18  1.37037554   Root MSE        =    .77798
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.5583
    Residual    9.07878566        15  .605252377   R-squared       =    0.6319
       Model     15.587974         3  5.19599133   Prob > F        =    0.0015
                                                   F(3, 15)        =      8.58
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        19
                                                                                          
                   _cons    -7.442558   .1635202   -45.51   0.000    -7.793274   -7.091842
         Taxablecapacity     .4306128   .0104764    41.10   0.000     .4081432    .4530824
          Taxeffortindex     17.27001   .1780144    97.01   0.000      16.8882    17.65181
PresumptivePaymentsinGDP     .0431453   .0470711     0.92   0.375    -.0578123    .1441029
      SimplifiedTaxinGDP     .0091658   .0803028     0.11   0.911    -.1630667    .1813982
                                                                                          
       CollectedVATinGDP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
       Total    28.8055123        18  1.60030624   Root MSE        =    .03942
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9990
    Residual    .021749702        14   .00155355   R-squared       =    0.9992
       Model    28.7837626         4  7.19594064   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 14)        =   4631.93
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        19
. regress CollectedVATinGDP SimplifiedTaxinGDP PresumptivePaymentsinGDP Taxeffortindex Taxablecapacity
Table 8. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test results 









Collected VAT to 
GDP 
-2.341 -4.427 -3.750 -3.000 -2.630 
Collected 
Simplified Tax to 
GDP 
-1.738 -3.265 -3.750 -3.000 -2.630 
Collected Pres. 
Payments to GDP 
-1.911 -4.468 -3.750 -3.000 -2.630 
VAT effort index -3.009 -5.75 -3.750 -3.000 -2.630 
VAT taxable 
Capacity 
-1.53 -3.513 -3.750 -3.000 -2.630 
 
 
Table 9. Eigenvalue stability condition 
 
 
Table 10. Lagrange-multiplier test (LM test) 
 
   VAR satisfies stability condition.
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.
                                            
      .2999244                   .299924    
       .353573                   .353573    
     -.0846532 -  .3871222i       .39627    
     -.0846532 +  .3871222i       .39627    
     -.6606451                   .660645    
                                            
           Eigenvalue            Modulus    
                                            
   Eigenvalue stability condition
. varstable, graph
   H0: no autocorrelation at lag order
                                          
     12      20.6035    25     0.71450    
     11      20.7747    25     0.70510    
     10      16.5541    25     0.89733    
      9      21.4926    25     0.66485    
      8      28.5239    25     0.28431    
      7      16.4729    25     0.90002    
      6      30.3061    25     0.21303    
      5      21.2691    25     0.67751    
      4      32.5215    25     0.14347    
      3      30.3532    25     0.21134    
      2      34.9175    25     0.08971    
      1      26.7916    25     0.36637    
                                          
    lag         chi2    df   Prob > chi2  
                                          
   Lagrange-multiplier test
. varlmar, mlag(12)
Table 11. Granger causality test 
 
  















                                                                      
              Tax_Cap                ALL    107.89     8    0.000     
              Tax_Cap         Tax_Effort    18.917     2    0.000     
              Tax_Cap           Pres_Pay    8.8259     2    0.012     
              Tax_Cap          Simpl_Tax    9.6071     2    0.008     
              Tax_Cap                VAT    20.204     2    0.000     
                                                                      
           Tax_Effort                ALL    32.219     8    0.000     
           Tax_Effort            Tax_Cap    9.5183     2    0.009     
           Tax_Effort           Pres_Pay    3.2472     2    0.197     
           Tax_Effort          Simpl_Tax    3.4587     2    0.177     
           Tax_Effort                VAT     9.791     2    0.007     
                                                                      
             Pres_Pay                ALL    57.413     8    0.000     
             Pres_Pay            Tax_Cap    32.596     2    0.000     
             Pres_Pay         Tax_Effort     31.43     2    0.000     
             Pres_Pay          Simpl_Tax    5.6774     2    0.059     
             Pres_Pay                VAT    33.283     2    0.000     
                                                                      
            Simpl_Tax                ALL    28.078     8    0.000     
            Simpl_Tax            Tax_Cap     6.084     2    0.048     
            Simpl_Tax         Tax_Effort    7.1592     2    0.028     
            Simpl_Tax           Pres_Pay    1.9927     2    0.369     
            Simpl_Tax                VAT    7.1979     2    0.027     
                                                                      
                  VAT                ALL    25.856     8    0.001     
                  VAT            Tax_Cap    2.1612     2    0.339     
                  VAT         Tax_Effort    1.4326     2    0.489     
                  VAT           Pres_Pay    2.3239     2    0.313     
                  VAT          Simpl_Tax    6.0136     2    0.049     
                                                                      
             Equation           Excluded     chi2     df Prob > chi2  
                                                                      
   Granger causality Wald tests
VAT Simplified Tax 
Simplified Tax Taxable Capacity 
Presumptive Payments  Taxable Capacity 
Tax effort index Taxable Capacity 




Table 13. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) test 
 
 
 
